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Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Petitioner Broadcast International ("Broadcast") submits 
this Reply Brief in response to the Brief of Respondent Utah State 
Tax Commission ("Tax Commission"). Broadcast believes many of Tax 
Commission's arguments are extremely unfair, and that twenty-five 
pages is inadequate to respond to the sheer volume of specious 
arguments. For that reason, this brief concentrates on the most 
egregious of the Tax Commission's arguments. Broadcast rests on 
its initial brief as a reply to those arguments not otherwise 
addressed herein. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Broadcast disputes the Tax Commission's framing of ISSUE 1 and 
ISSUE 4 as stated in Respondent's brief. 
The quintessential holding of the Tax Commission's Final 
Decision is that Broadcast did not grant its subscribers the right 
to possession, operation or use of its equipment. This ruling is 
part of the Decision and Order and is not a Finding of Fact. Final 
Decision at 11. Refusing to accept their own client's framing of 
the issues, the Tax Commission's lawyers attempt to recast ISSUE 1 
as an issue of fact ("whether the Tax Commission's determination is 
supported by substantial evidence") rather than law, in an apparent 
attempt to trigger this Court's deference to the Tax Commission's 
Final Decision as a finding of fact. This stratagem impliedly 
assumes that (1) there are disputed facts; and (2) the definition 
of "sale" in Section 59-12-102(10) fluctuates with each different 
fact pattern.1 
1
 As demonstrated infra, a recurrent problem with the Tax Commission's 
brief is its obvious departure from the Tax Commission's Final Decision. 
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Both assumptions are false. Broadcast accepted the Tax 
Commission's Findings of Fact. Petitioner's Brief at 5. There 
are, therefore, no disputed material facts and the Tax Commission 
lawyers' attempt to manipulate "ISSUE 1" from a legal issue into a 
factual one should be rejected. 
Based upon uncontroverted facts, the Tax Commission's Final 
Decision (again distinguished from the Tax Commission's brief on 
this appeal) framed the primary issue as follows: 
Broadcast's purchase of equipment from Utah 
vendors is not subject to sales and use tax 
under 59-12-102(1)(a) if purchased for resale. 
In the context of this case, Broadcast can 
only establish such a resale by showing that 
it granted the subscribers the right to pos-
session, the right to operate, or the right to 
use such equipment. 
Decision and Order at 11 (emphasis added). 
Broadcast agrees with this framing of the issue. Petitioner's 
Brief at 13. Broadcast also agrees that resolution of this issue 
depends upon whether Broadcast granted its subscribers a "right to 
possession, operation or use" of its equipment, within the meaning 
of Section 59-12-102 (10) (e) . If so, Broadcast's initial purchases 
are nontaxable purchases for resale. 
Because the Utah Legislature has not explicitly vested the Tax 
Commission with discretion to interpret Section 59-12-102(10) (e), 
there is no menu of permissible legal interpretations. Rather, 
there is a correct legal definition for "right to possession, 
operation or use" which must be applied to undisputed facts. 
Hence, ISSUE 1 is an issue of law, not an issue of fact. 
"ISSUE 4" as stated in the Tax Commission's brief - whether 
the negligence penalty is justified - is a legal, not a factual 
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issue, because the Tax Commission's Final Decision does not 
mention, much less apply, the appropriate legal standard in 
deciding whether Broadcast was "negligent" in "failing to pay" the 
assessed sales and use taxes. Following Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. 
v. State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992) , the Tax 
Commission should have, but did not, ask whether Broadcast 
maintained a "good faith" doubt concerning the taxability of its 
transactions. Id. at 309. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Broadcast relies upon the same statutes cited in its initial 
brief, primarily Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10). These statutes 
are included in Appendix A. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Having miscast the issues, the Tax Commission misstates the 
standard of review. The Tax Commission argues that Utah Code Ann. 
59-1-610 (1) (b) (1993), which mandates a "correction of error" 
standard for reviewing the Tax Commission's conclusions of law, 
(except in narrow circumstances) does not apply to this case. The 
Tax Commission urges this Court to adopt instead an "intermediate 
standard of review" (i.e. "to assure that the agency's findings 
fell within the bounds of reasonableness") because this case 
"involves both factual findings and legal conclusions." 
Respondent's Brief at 2. 
The Tax Commission's argument is preposterous and should be 
rejected out of hand for several reasons. First, as explained 
above, almost all the issues in this case are issues of law arising 
from uncontroverted or uncontrovertible facts, which should be 
reviewed under a "correction of error" standard. See Savage 
88366 3 
Industries Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 
1991) .2 
Second, and more important, by arguing that this case raises 
"mixed questions of law and fact" calling for an intermediate 
standard of review, the Tax Commission seriously misapprehends the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") , Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-
1 through 24 and the new amendments to the Tax Court Act, Utah Code 
Ann. 69-1-610(1) and (2) (1993).3 
Since 1988, UAPA Section 63-46b-10 has provided that the 
agency head, following a formal hearing, must enter its "findings 
of fact" and "conclusions of law." Consequently, there was no need 
for Section 59-1-610(1) to specify a standard for reviewing "mixed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law" when the Tax Commission, 
under UAPA, is not authorized to enter them. 
Moreover, there are no longer common law standards for 
judicial review, as the Tax Commission argues on the basis of an 
obsolete 1983 case, Utah Department of Administrative Services v. 
2
 The only issue that should not be reviewed under a "correction of error" 
standard in this case is ISSUE 5, which is "Whether the Tax Commission erred in 
finding that Broadcast sold tangible personal property to Osmond rather than a 
nontaxable service." Both parties agree ISSUE 5 raises an issue of fact to which 
this Court should apply a "substantial evidence" standard. Petitioner's Brief 
at 2. 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1) provides: 
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings 
commenced before the commission, the Court of Appeals or 
the Supreme Court shall: 
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its 
written findings of fact, applying a substantial 
evidence standard on review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning 
its conclusions of law, applying a correction of error 
standard, unless there is an explicit grant of 
discretion contained in a statute at issue before the 
appellate court. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). Respondent's 
Brief a t 2. "UAPA upset these previously s e t t l e d s tandards ." 
SEMECO Indus t r i e s , Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 849 P.2d 
1167, 1170 (Utah 1993) (Durham J . , d i s sen t ing ) . 
Further, newly enacted Section 59-1-610(1) s t a t e s tha t the 
"correct ion of error" standard "shal l" be applied to the Tax 
Commission's "conclusions of law" unless the s t a t u t e a t issue 
includes an e x p l i c i t grant of d i sc re t ion to the Commission (which 
both p a r t i e s in t h i s case acknowledge i s absen t ) . Section 59-1-
610(2) s t a t e s tha t the "correction of error" standard supersedes 
the otherwise appl icable UAPA standards for review. Perforce, 
Section 59-1-610(1) supersedes the 1983 common law standards of 
review which the Tax Commission urges t h i s Court to apply.4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Tax Commission's Statement of Facts, as authored by the 
Tax Commission lawyers in Respondent's Brief, i s s t r i k ing ly 
d i f ferent from the Tax Commission's Findings of Fact s ta ted in i t s 
Final Decision. Broadcast accepted the Final Decision 's Findings 
of Fact. P e t i t i o n e r ' s Brief a t 5. In summary, the s a l i en t facts 
are tha t Broadcast, pursuant to contract , provides broadcasting 
4
 The Tax Commission's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Sec t ion 59-1-610(1) f inds no 
support in r ecen t case law. In Mi l l e r Welding Supply, I n c . v . Utah S t a t e Tax 
Commission, 860 P.2d 361 (Utah 1993), t h i s Court, without d i s c u s s i o n , app l i ed the 
" c o r r e c t i o n of e r r o r " s tandard mandated in Sect ion 59-1-610(1) t o the Tax 
Commission's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Sect ion 59-12-102(4) (a) ( i i i ) of the Sa les and Use 
Tax Act, which makes purchases of "oxygen" exempt. In OSI I n d u s t r i e s v . Utah 
S t a t e Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 381 (Utah 1993), t h i s Court app l i ed the same 
" c o r r e c t i o n of e r r o r " s t andard r e t r o a c t i v e l y t o the Tax Commission's i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n of Sec t ion 59-12-104 (20) of the Sales and Use Tax Act, which makes purchases 
of "sprays and i n s e c t i c i d e s " exempt from s a l e s t a x e s . In Knowledge Data Systems 
v . Utah S t a t e Tax Commission, 1993 WL 533784 (Utah App.) , t h i s Court app l i ed the 
" c o r r e c t i o n of e r r o r " s tandard t o the Tax Commission's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
Sec t ion 59-12-103(14) of the Sales and Use Tax Act, which makes " i s o l a t e d and 
occas iona l s a l e s " exempt from t a x a t i o n . The Tax Commission was reversed in a l l 
t h r e e c a s e s . 
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serv ices ( i . e . background music, i n - s t o r e commercials, 
te leconferencing, "E" mail, e t c . ) to i t s subscr ibers ( typ ica l ly 
large r e t a i l chains l i ke Safeway) via e l ec t ron ic equipment ( i . e . 
r ece ive rs , s a t e l l i t e dishes and p r in t e r s ) which Broadcast i n s t a l l s 
on and in the subsc r ibe r ' s s t o r e s . See Final Decision, Findings of 
Fact 1 through 28. 
On appeal, the Tax Commission lawyers, again ignoring t h e i r 
own c l i e n t ' s Findings of Fact, r e c i t e a l i t a n y of la rge ly 
i r r e l evan t fac ts in an apparent attempt to mislead t h i s Court. 
Some examples follow: 
1. Statement of Facts , paragraphs 7, 8, 14, 15, 16, and 2 0 
s t r e s s tha t t i t l e to the equipment remained with Broadcast. The 
apparent in ten t in hammering t h i s fact i s to imply tha t a sa le from 
Broadcast to i t s subscriber could not have occurred because t i t l e 
never passed. The Tax Commission's Auditing Division repeatedly 
made t h i s argument below, two audi tors ignorant ly claiming tha t 
under Utah law t i t l e had to pass for a taxable sa le to occur.5 
Conclusively, under Section 59-12-102(10)(e), a s a l e , for 
sa les and use tax purposes, occurs if the "r ight to possession, 
5
 Q- [By Mr. Mi l l e r ] Let me ask you the q u e s t i o n . What i s 
possess ion? 
A. [By Ms. Andersen] Possess ion , t o me, means ownership. 
Q. I t means ownership? 
A. Yes, i f I possess something, I own i t . 
Depos i t ion of Anna Andersen a t 16. When shown t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of "possess ion" 
was i r r e c o n c i l a b l e with the Tax Code, Ms. Andersen suddenly changed her 
tes t imony, s t a t i n g , "I 'm t e l l i n g you t h a t my own d e f i n i t i o n of posses s ion means 
ownership. But in contex t of the Code, pos ses s ion means the r i g h t t o use and 
c o n t r o l . " i d . a t 17. Even t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of "possess ion" i s wrong because 
Sec t ion 59-12-102(10) (e) s t a t e s "possess ion , ope ra t i on or use" meaning t h a t "use" 
and "opera t ion" a re not synonymous with "posses s ion . " Audi tor Michael Kenney, 
who made the d e c i s i o n t o t a x Broadcast (depos i t ion of Michael Kenney a t 7) a l s o 
s t a t e d t h a t " I ' d say t h a t i f they [Broadcast] t r a n s f e r r e d t i t l e i s an important 
p a r t . " I d . a t 17. 
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operation or use" of tangible personal property is transferred 
pursuant to contract or lease, even if title is not. The Tax 
Commission's incessant harping over the lack of title passage thus 
misleads this Court. 
2. The Tax Commission's Statement of Facts, paragraphs 5 and 
6, observe that the "receivers" are "passive" devices in that once 
properly tuned they seldom need to be physically manipulated by the 
subscriber. The apparent implication of this fact is that 
Broadcast's subscribers do not "possess" this equipment, as if the 
"right to possession, operation or use" under Section 59-12-
102(10) (e) required physical manipulation of the equipment. There 
is no legal authority or logical basis for such a position. 
Consequently, the Tax Commission's persistence in stressing that 
the receivers were "passive" devices misleads this Court. 
Most important, the Tax Commission's legal conclusion, that 
Broadcast's subscribers had no right to possession, is flatly 
irreconcilable with what the Senior Tax Auditor of the case, Rick 
Mitchell, admitted.6 
6
 Q [by Mr. Miller] Now, I asked you a moment ago whether the 
subscriber had a right to possession, operation or use, and 
you told me you thought they had control of that tangible 
personal property. 
A [by Mr. Mitchell] I believe so. 
Q Do they have possession of it? 
A Yes. 
Q Do they operate it? 
A They say they do, yes, I've never seen one. 
Q Tell me, then what's missing? I guess I don't 
understand. We've already established that it is 
a transaction. We've already established that 
the subscriber has the right to possession, 
88366 7 
3. The Tax Commission's Statement of Facts is also mislead-
ing because it attempts to disguise legal arguments as facts. In 
paragraph 11, for instance, the Tax Commission states that "To be 
consistent with its 'resale' theory, Broadcast should have 
collected sales tax on the entire subscription fee since Broadcast 
did not itemize the cost of the equipment in the service agree-
ments." Respondent's Brief at 7. That is an incompetent and 
incorrect legal argument Auditor Rick Mitchell made at the formal 
hearing. Hearing Tr. 338, lines 1-15. It is not a statement of 
fact. Mr. Mitchell's legal argument would only be true under a 
lease calling for a stream of payments. It ignores a grant of 
rights under a "contract" which may not require a stream of 
payments for the equipment. Even assuming Mr. Mitchell was correct 
as to Utah law, Mr. Mitchell is incompetent to testify as to the 
law of other states, which would be applied to well over 95% of the 
transactions at issue in this case.7 
4. Paragraph 12 of the Tax Commission's Statement of Facts 
is misleading because it implies that Broadcast itself must have 
consumed the equipment (and hence owed Utah use taxes) since 
Broadcast checked the "goods consumed" box on its sales tax license 
form. This conclusion follows only by indulging a giant leap of 
operation and use. And I think we have agreed 
that this equipment is tangible personal 
property. And we have agreed it is a contract. 
A Right. 
Deposition of Rick Mitchell at 12 and 13. 
7
 See Hearing Tr. at 362 in which the Hearing Officer, Mr. Hennebold, ruled 
that Mr. Mitchell's colleague Anna Andersen was incompetent to testify as to the 
law of other states. Mr. Hennebold stated, "It seems to me there is no ability 
for her to testify, no competence on that." 
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logic. The "goods consumed" box was inclusive of many Broadcast 
purchases (offices supplies, furniture, etc.) for which Broadcast 
paid a Utah sales or use tax. Testimony of Reese Davis, Hearing 
Tr. at 127, 129. 
Paragraph 12 also implies the equally ludicrous assumption 
that an audit deficiency against Broadcast can be justified upon 
what box Broadcast checked on a sales and use tax license form, 
rather than what actually transpired between Broadcast and its 
subscribers and what they intended.8 
5. A similar point should be made about paragraph 13 in 
which the Tax Commission states that Broadcast told the jurisdic-
tions in which its subscribers operated that Broadcast would pay 
any use tax due on its equipment. The implied conclusion here is 
that Broadcast was the end user of such equipment. The undisputed 
facts are inapposite. Broadcast was contractually bound to pay all 
applicable sales and use taxes the subscriber would have incurred 
for its use of the equipment. Testimony of Reed Benson, Hearing 
Tr. at 229, 230, 240 and 243. 
6. Paragraphs 19 and 20 state that Broadcast was required to 
maintain the equipment and that it had the right to remove or 
replace it. From those statements, the implied conclusion is that 
because Broadcast has rights in the equipment the subscribers have 
none. This argument is absurd. Broadcast had rights in its own 
equipment like a lessor has rights in its tangible personal 
property. Irrespective of whatever rights Broadcast retains, the 
8
 A basic premise of tax law is that transactions should be taxed in 
accordance with their economic substance and not their form. Gregory v. 
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
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subscribers have certain rights including the "right to possession, 
operation or use" of the equipment granted to them under a 
contract. Both parties to the agreement -- Broadcast and its 
subscriber --so testified.9 
7. Finally, Broadcast's sole maintenance obligation for the 
equipment, noted in Paragraph 20, has no conceivable relevance in 
deciding whether Broadcast granted the "right to possession, 
operation or use" of the equipment to its subscribers, which is 
this Court's exclusive concern in deciding the primary issue of 
this case. Paragraph 20 also omits those facts which demonstrate 
that the subscribers had substantial rights to and obligations for 
the equipment, such as the subscriber's obligation to bear the risk 
of loss for damage to the equipment. Testimony of Dwight Egan, 
Hearing Tr. at 55. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TAX COMMISSION DISTORTS GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND 
PRECEDENT TO TAX BROADCAST FOR SALES MADE TO OUT-OF-STATE 
SUBSCRIBERS. 
A. The Tax Commission's theory for taxing Broadcast wrongly 
presupposes that (1) Broadcast's claim rests exclusively 
upon an "exemption" rather than an "exclusion" from 
taxation; and that (2) the Tax Commission may interpret 
statutes "to its satisfaction." 
The Tax Commission's first argument under point I of its brief 
is based upon two mistaken premises. The argument is that 
Broadcast must pay sales taxes upon its purchases unless "it can 
prove to the satisfaction of the Commission that an exemption 
9
 As subscriber John Lasater from SaveMart testified, "SaveMart views the 
word possession as the fact that we have the equipment secured at our store 
locations. We physically have the equipment." Hearing Tr. at 106. "We use the 
equipment. It operates for us." Id. 
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applies." Respondent's Brief at 12 (emphasis added). An initial 
nonsequitur with this argument is that it wrongly presupposes that 
all sales of tangible personal property are taxable absent some 
exemption. Section 59-12-102(8)(a) of the Utah Sales and Use Tax 
Act expressly excludes the "resale of . . . [tangible personal] 
property" from the definition of "Retail sale," which means that 
"sales for resale" are not part of the tax base. Likewise the 
definition of "storage" in Section 59-12-102(12) excludes a "sale 
made in the regular course of business" from the tax base. 
In addition, "sales for resale" qualify for the exemption 
under Section 59-12-104(28). Because Sections 59-12-102(8)(a) and 
Section 59-12-102(12) establish the tax base, they are taxing 
statues, not exemptions,10 and must be construed in favor of the 
taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority.11 See, e.g. , 
Pacific Intermountain Express v. Utah State Tax Commission, 329 
P.2d 650, 651 (Utah 1958) ("taxing statutes are to be construed 
strictly, and in favor of the taxpayer where doubtful."); Merrill 
Bean Chevrolet, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397, 398 
(1980) ("we have also held taxing statutes, where doubtful, are to 
be construed strictly, and in favor of the taxpayer."); Parson 
Asphalt Products, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397, 398 
(1980) ("even though taxing statutes should generally be construed 
10
 Even under a Section 59-12-104 (28) "strict construction" analysis, 
Broadcast's initial purchases are exempt because they are purchases for resale 
based upon Section 59-12-102(10) (e)'s definition of sale. 
11
 The Tax Commission's strategy for dealing with this argument has simply 
been to ignore Section 59-12-103(8) (a), Section 59-12-103(1) and the cases cited 
above as if they neither existed nor said what they say. 
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favorable to the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing 
authority . . .") . 
A second and more damaging defect in the Tax Commission's 
first argument is its assertion that statutes may be interpreted to 
its "satisfaction, " as if the Tax Commission were a beneficent 
king. There is no authority for this assertion. To the contrary, 
many cases decided in the past year expressly hold that the Tax 
Commission does not have discretion to interpret the Utah Sales and 
Use Tax Act. See cases cited in footnote 4. 
B. The Tax Commission's reliance on Nucor Corp. distorts the 
facts and holding of that case. 
Another fatal flaw in the Tax Commission's argument is its 
tortuous reading of Nucor Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 832 
P.2d 1294 (Utah 1992) . To begin, the Tax Commission correctly 
states the Utah Supreme Court concluded in Nucor that "'purchase 
for resale' implies that a company's purpose in buying an item must 
be to resell that item." Respondent's Brief at 13 quoting Nucor 
at 1296. However, this unexceptional observation begs the question 
in this case as to whether Broadcast had such a resale intent when 
it initially purchased the equipment. 
The Tax Commission's brief on appeal (again as distinguished 
from the Tax Commission's Final Decision which makes no such 
finding) contends that Broadcast had no resale intent because 
"Nucor [Broadcast in this instance] purchased the items at issue 
primarily for their use as equipment and only incidentally for 
their use as ingredients in the manufacturing process." 
Respondent's Brief at 13 (second emphasis added)." The fallacy of 
this contention is twofold. 
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One, it simply assumes, again without evidence, that Broadcast 
purchased the equipment for its own use. The uncontroverted facts 
are inapposite. The equipment at issue simply passed through Utah, 
in unopened boxes, to the out-of-state subscriber sites. Broadcast 
gave its vendors an exemption certificate thereby evincing its 
resale intent. Final Decision at 5, paragraph 22. 
Two, Nucor's facts, which compelled the Supreme Court's 
holding, are alien and dissimilar to the facts in this case. Nucor 
"used" the items at issue "as ingredients" in its "manufacturing" 
process. The equipment Broadcast purchased simply sat in unopened 
boxes until deployed out of state. Broadcast manufactures nothing. 
Its equipment does not become an "ingredient" for anything. 
Broadcast simply installs the equipment without alteration on the 
subscriber premises. 
C. The Tax Commission's legal rationale has been ever-
shifting, but always to Broadcast's detriment. 
In this case, the ever-shifting rationale for taxing Broadcast 
has subjected it to unconscionable unfairness. For example, the 
Tax Commission: 
(1) initially issued an audit deficiency under one theory. 
The auditors simply assumed the equipment Broadcast purchased was 
taxable as "goods consumed." The auditors never bothered to 
inquire about a defense under Section 59-12-102 (10) (e),12 even 
Rick Mitchell testified: 
Q [By Mr. Miller] Did you ask them whether the 
right to possession, operation or use was 
transferred by their contract or sales service 
agreement? 
A [By Mr. Mitchell] No we did not. 
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though "Broadcast [contemporaneously] provided an exemption 
certification stating that the receivers were being purchased for 
resale." Final Decision at 5, paragraph 22; 
(2) prosecuted the audit deficiency under another theory. In 
light of Mr. Mitchell's admissions, uncontrovertible testimony, and 
common sense that Broadcast subscribers had the "right to 
possession, operation or use" of the equipment, the Attorney 
General nonetheless concocted arguments that Broadcast retained 
"beneficial possession" of the equipment, and that none of the 800 
jurisdictions outside Utah could tax the subscribers (even though 
all of them did) because "it would involve the transfer of . . . 
property across state lines . . ." ;13 
Q Did you ask them whether the subscribers had 
possession? 
A No. 
Q And you didn't ask them about operation or use 
either did you? 
A That's correct. 
Hearing Tr. at 339. 
13
 Anna Andersen testified: 
Q [by Mr. Miller] Were you aware that in that memorandum 
[filed by the Auditing Division] the argument is made 
that Broadcast has, quote, beneficial possession, 
unquote, of this equipment? 
A [by Ms. Andersen] I didn't read it carefully 
enough to even remember seeing the word 
beneficial possession. 
Q So that's not a concept you came up with? 
A No. 
Hearing Tr. at 371. See Memorandum in Opposition to Broadcast's Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 5, and in Support of Auditing Division's Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 4. 
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(3) decided the case under ano the r t h e o r y . The Tax 
Commission's F ina l Decis ion holds t h a t Broadcast "did not g r an t " 
i t s s u b s c r i b e r s a r i g h t t o p o s s e s s i o n , o p e r a t i o n or use of the 
equipment. F ina l Decis ion a t 11 ; and 
(4) r e s u r r e c t e d a theory on appeal t h a t Broadcast "used" i t s 
own equipment, even though the F ina l Decis ion makes no such 
f i n d i n g . This argument f l i e s in the face of Chet P a u l s e n ' s 
uncon t rove r t ed tes t imony t h a t the equipment simply passed through 
Utah " f u l l y assembled," "packaged in i n d i v i d u a l boxes , " and t h a t 
the equipment was shipped o u t s i d e Utah t o the s u b s c r i b e r s , u s u a l l y 
w i t h i n 24 hours , s t i l l i n the o r i g i n a l c r a t e s . Hearing Tr . a t 
277.14 The Tax Commission's e v e r - s h i f t i n g r a t i o n a l e for t a x a t i o n 
ev inces an unlawful p r o - t a x b i a s a g a i n s t Broadcas t . 1 5 
I I . THE TAX COMMISSION'S BRIEF, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM ITS FINAL 
DECISION, TWISTS THE UNDISPUTED FACTS TO JUSTIFY TAXATION. 
Having ignored the d e f i n i t i o n of "Re ta i l s a l e " in Sec t ion 59-
12-102(8) , d i s t o r t e d Nucor and s h i f t e d the j u s t i f i c a t i o n for 
t a x a t i o n , t he Tax Commission then argues under Point I of i t s b r i e f 
t h a t the " f a c t s " r e c i t e d between pages 13 and 17 of i t s b r i e f 
"support the f i nd ings of the Tax Commission . . . " Respondent ' s 
Br ief a t 17. This argument i s as tounding because almost none of 
14
 I t a l s o ignores the hold ing in Knowledge Data Systems v . Utah S t a t e Tax 
Commission, 1993 WL 533784 (Utah App.) because B r o a d c a s t ' s purchase of the 
equipment and i t s subsequent deployment of the equipment by g ran t of possess ion 
t o the s u b s c r i b e r s i s " inexorably l inked" and should be viewed as one 
t r a n s a c t i o n . 
15
 Broadcast i s e n t i t l e d t o r e l y upon the Tax Commission's F ina l Decision 
as the j u s t i f i c a t i o n for t a x a t i o n . To hold o therwise would be t o v i o l a t e 
B r o a d c a s t ' s r i g h t s under UAPA. See UAPA Sect ion 63-46b-16 which s t a t e s t h a t the 
a p p e l l a t e cour t w i l l review the agency ' s " f i n a l d e c i s i o n , " not arguments the 
Audi t ing Div i s ion made before the Tax Commission, or a phantom Decision the Tax 
Commission could have i s sued i f t h e i r a t t o r n e y s , r a t h e r than the Commission, had 
i s sued i t . 
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the facts recited between pages 13 and 17 of the Tax Commission's 
brief can be found in the Tax Commission's Findings of Fact in the 
Final Decision, The Tax Commission, again as distinguished from 
its brief on appeal, apparently felt that whatever representations 
Reese Davis and others made were not helpful in deciding whether 
Broadcast granted "possession, use or operation" of the equipment 
to its subscribers. 
A. The Testimony of Reese Davis is the reverse of what the 
Tax Commission now claims. 
Assuming, however, that the selective quotations recited as 
"fact" in the Tax Commission's brief, again as distinguished from 
the Tax Commission's Final Decision, have relevance, the Tax 
Commission's brief badly distorts them. For example, the Tax 
Commission quotes Reese Davis, Broadcast's Treasurer, as stating 
that "I did not want them [the taxing jurisdictions outside Utah] 
to believe in any way, shape, or form that we had sold the 
equipment in a commercial sense, i.e. conveyed title." 
Respondent's Brief at 14, Hearing Tr. lines 15-22 (emphasis added). 
In this quotation, Reese Davis said precisely what he meant -
that title to the equipment had not passed to the subscriber and 
that therefore no sale "in the commercial sense" had occurred. The 
Tax Commission's brief twists this nearly self-evident explanation 
to conclude that Broadcast consumed the equipment it purchased. In 
contrast, the Tax Commission's Final Decision recognizes that 
Broadcast would have "sold" its equipment (for sales and use tax 
purposes) had it granted "the right of possession, operation or 
use" of the equipment to its subscribers, even though title did not 
pass. 
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A similar point can be made about Reese Davis7 observation 
that "we [Broadcast] would be consuming, using and operating the 
equipment to the extent provided by our contracts of that equipment 
outside of the State of Utah." Respondent's Brief at 15, quoting 
Hearing Tr. 131 (emphasis added). By this statement Reese Davis 
did not mean the subscriber had no right to possess, operate and 
use the equipment. Broadcast indeed had certain rights, but the 
subscriber had the "right to possession, operation or use" of the 
equipment, which are the only "rights" which count here. Hearing 
Tr. 132 (Broadcast bought the equipment with a "resale intention"). 
B. The Tax Commission twists the undisputed facts of the 
case to claim that the subscriber's possession of the 
equipment is insignificant. 
The Tax Commission distorts other facts, including: 
1. The Tax Commission claims the equipment would have 
no independent value without Broadcast's services. Respondent's 
Brief at 21. This assertion is not "fact," it is conjecture. As 
explained infra, under Young, this conjecture, even if true, is not 
relevant. More to the point here, however, is that the conjecture 
is false. John Lasater testified SaveMart uses Broadcast's 
equipment for check authorization and verification, a service 
Broadcast does not provide. Hearing Tr. at 103-106. There was no 
contrary testimony. 
2. The Tax Commission claims the "ration [sic] of 
[services to equipment is] nearly 13 to 1." Respondent's Brief 
at 21. Reese Davis testified to the contrary, that "50 percent of 
cash flow from this contract goes to pay equipment costs and 
expenses." Hearing Tr. at 158. This conclusion was uncontroverted 
and is based upon net present value of cash flows. 
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In summary, the Tax Commission's brief quotes snippets of 
testimony, and attributes a self-serving meaning to them which the 
witnesses expressly denied under oath, 
C. Broadcast's transfer of tangible personal property to its 
subscribers cannot lawfully be disregarded simply because 
Broadcast also sells them a service. 
The Tax Commission repeatedly states that Broadcast has not 
granted possession, operation or use of the equipment to its 
subscribers because it sold them a service. The faulty premise to 
this argument is that the two (a sale of service and a sale of 
property) are mutually exclusive. Young, discussed infra, is to 
the contrary.16 The Tax Commission's reliance on three cases17 
for support of this premise is particularly illogical because the 
facts of those cases are inapposite to the undisputed facts here. 
1. White held that a charge assessed cable subscribers for 
converters was not for the rent of tangible personal property and 
was not subject to Alabama's rental tax. The taxpayer in White 
offered "Tier service," which made available additional programming 
to that offered through basic service. For those subscribers with 
conventional televisions, a converter was necessary to receive Tier 
service. "Cable-ready" televisions in White had so proliferated 
that the taxpayer was hard pressed to make an argument that it sold 
tangible personal property when most of its customers did not need 
a "converter." 
16
 Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 805 P.2d 176 (1990) is 
also to the contrary. Haroldsen held that the sale of computerized lists (an 
intangible) was nonetheless taxable because it was tied to the sale of tangible 
property. 
17
 White v. Storer Cable Communications, 507 So. 2d 964 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1987) ; BJ-Titan Services v. State Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992) ; Hardy 
v. Utah State Tax Commission, 561 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1977). 
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In this case, however, all witnesses speaking on the subject 
testified it was impossible to receive Broadcast's services without 
the equipment. The de minimus value of the converters in White, 
from $40 to $105, cannot logically or honestly be equated with the 
value of Broadcast's equipment, which is 50% of the contract's net 
present value. Testimony of Reese Davis, Hearing Tr. at 158. 
2. BJ-Titan Services v. State Tax Commission states that "the 
essence of the transaction" test does not apply when severable 
tangible personal property is used "in the process of . 
rendering services." Id. at 825. Under such circumstances, the 
issue is "who is the ultimate user or consumer of the tangible 
personal property," and who, as a result, should pay the sales or 
use tax. Id. Like the auto mechanic example in BJ-Titan, 
Broadcast installs tangible personal property without alteration. 
Thus the tax should be, and has been, paid by the subscriber (or by 
Broadcast for the subscriber) to its taxing jurisdiction. 
Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1) overrules BJ-Titan to the 
extent it gives deference to the Tax Commission's decision on what 
constitutes the "essence of the transaction." 
3. Hardy v. Utah State Tax Commission holds that dentists are 
consumers of the materials they use in fixing teeth. They must 
then either separate materials from services or collect a sales tax 
from their patient on the value of materials and services. 
Broadcast, however, consumes nothing. Again, unlike the dentists 
in Hardy. Broadcast installs the equipment without alteration. 
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III. THE TAX COMMISSION HAS DISREGARDED STATUTES AND CASE LAW 
DIRECTLY ON POINT TO TAX BROADCAST. 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) (e) cannot be disregarded 
by the Tax Commission as "inoperative." 
In its analysis of Section 59-12-102 (10) (e) , the Tax 
Commission's brief, again as distinguished from the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision, makes the outlandish argument that the 
statute has "no operative effect." Respondent's Brief at 18. 
This argument cannot be taken seriously. If, to illustrate, 
Section 59-12-102 (10) (e) "has no operative effect," there is no 
authority to tax lease payments in which tangible personal 
property, but not title, is transferred from one to another.18 
B. Young Electric Sign v. Utah State Tax Commission is 
directly on point in Broadcast's favor. 
The Tax Commission's arguments in this case are demonstrably 
Machiavellian in light of case law directly on point. In 1955, the 
Tax Commission successfully argued in Young Electric Sign v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 291 P.2d 900 (Utah 1955) that Young's 
transfer of possession of an electric sign from itself to its 
customer was a taxable sale under the predecessor to Section 59-12-
102 (10) (e), even though Young retained title to the sign. 
Significantly, the Tax Commission's Final Decision in this case 
does not mention Young, even though the case was extensively 
briefed. Apparently, it is easier to tax Broadcast if it is 
assumed Young does not exist. 
18
 If the facts of this case were slightly different, and a "seller" 
granted the right to "possession, operation, or use" of its property to in-state 
rather than out-of-state "purchasers," would the Tax Commission still argue, as 
it does here, that such a transaction is not a taxable sale? We think not. 
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The Tax Commission's brief offers a flawed analysis of Young. 
To begin, the Tax Commission correctly notes the two principal 
issues in Young: (1) whether some of Young's customers could be 
charged a sales tax for materials sold incidentally with services; 
and (2) whether a sales tax could be imposed upon Young's rental 
agreements with other customers. From a fair framing of the 
issues, however, the Tax Commission's analysis takes a crooked 
path. 
As to Issue 1, the Supreme Court held the Tax Commission had 
erred in imposing a tax on materials Young used in repair and 
maintenance of its signs, because they were incidental to the sale 
of service. The Tax Commission's brief concludes from this 
straightforward holding that Young is "relevant and controlling" 
(Respondent's Brief at 31) in this case. This conclusion cannot 
possibly be true from Young's facts, which, again significantly, 
the Tax Commission's brief omits. They are that "The customers did 
not obtain the right of possession or use of the sign as a result 
of such repair; they were the owners of the signs before the 
repairs were made." Id. at 902 (emphasis added). In this case, 
Broadcast's customers were never "title owners" of the equipment, 
as the Tax Commission never wearies from telling us elsewhere in 
its memoranda. Further, Broadcast has never argued that its 
maintenance of the equipment amounted to a grant of possession. 
The Tax Commission's analysis of Young is thus irreconcilably 
inconsistent with arguments it elsewhere advances, and, once again, 
evinces a strong pro-tax bias. 
Young's customers for Issue 1 were sign owners; for Issue 2 
they were not. On Issue 2, the Supreme Court held that Young's 
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transfer of possession of the signs under rental contracts was 
taxable. Broadcast relies upon this holding because it construes 
the predecessor statute to Section 59-12-102(10) (e) under similar 
circumstances to conclude that Young's transfer of tangible 
personal property to its customers was taxable. The Tax Commission 
cavalierly dismisses Young with the argument that "the principal 
transaction was the rental of the electric sign," whereas 
Broadcast's principal transaction was "providing services, not 
equipment." Respondent's Brief at 32. This is a fabricated 
distinction, which, even if true, is irrelevant. In Young, the 
customer had the right to advertise on Young's sign, just as in 
this case the subscriber has the right to advertise on Broadcast's 
equipment. Young also had a "service agreement" with its customer, 
just as in this case. The essential fact, however, was that in 
Young, "there is a transfer of the right to continuous possession 
of personal property," id. at 903, just as in this case. The only 
significant distinction between Young and this case is that 
Broadcast transferred possession of tangible personal property to 
its subscribers outside of Utah, which means that those sales are 
not taxable by Utah. Had Broadcast transferred possession of the 
equipment to its subscribers in Utah, we doubt the Tax Commission 
would be arguing such transfers of tangible personal property would 
not be taxable Utah sales. 
Finally, Young exposes the intellectual shallowness in the Tax 
Commission's argument that Section 59-12-102 (10) (e) can be 
disregarded as "inoperative," or that it need not be enforced 
because it is not part of a "comprehensive" taxing scheme. 
Respondent's Brief at 18. 
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IV. THE NEGLIGENCE PENALTY IS AN ABUSE OF THE TAX COMMISSIONS 
POWER. 
The Tax Commission's Final Decision justifies a "negligence 
penalty" on the ground that Broadcast has been "inattentive to its 
responsibilities" and has taken "inconsistent positions with 
respect to its in-state and out-of-state tax liabilities." Final 
Decision at 18. There are at least two defects in this analysis. 
First, the Tax Commission's Final Decision does not mention, much 
less apply, Chicago Bridge & Iron Company v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 839 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992) to determine whether Broadcast 
had a "good faith" argument against taxation. This, in itself, is 
manifest error. Second, the Tax Commission, in claiming that 
Broadcast had been "inconsistent" with respect to its "in-state" 
and "out-of-state" transactions, necessarily assumes that it is 
competent to determine the law of other jurisdictions. This is 
irreconcilable with the Hearing Officer's ruling that Anna Andersen 
was not competent to testify about the law of other jurisdictions, 
and his exclusion of such testimony. Hearing Tr. at 362. 
The Tax Commission's brief, again as distinguished from the 
Tax Commission's Final Decision, for the first time, responds to 
Broadcast's "good faith" defense against the negligence penalty. 
The argument is that "at the time [Broadcast] failed to pay sales 
taxes, it did not have a good faith basis to do so." Respondent's 
Brief at 42. This argument is badly flawed, this time for three 
reasons. First, it is factually incorrect and cannot be 
reconciled with the Final Decision. To reiterate, the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision found Broadcast issued an exemption 
certificate to its Utah vendor, which evinced a contemporaneous 
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in ten t tha t Broadcast claimed i t s purchases of the equipment in 
Utah were nontaxable sa les for r e s a l e . Second, Broadcast paid 
sa les or use taxes to approximately 800 taxing j u r i s d i c t i o n s 
throughout the United Sta tes in re l i ance upon advice from Vertex 
Tax Advisors, Inc . tha t "BI i s in t o t a l compliance and has stood 
the t e s t of any s t a t e audi t tha t has been conducted." P e t i t i o n e r ' s 
Hearing Exhibit P-22, p . l . Third, the Auditing Division would have 
imposed a negligence penalty under any circumstances, even in the 
face of a good f a i th defense.19 
19
 The fol lowing exchange demonstra tes t h a t the neg l igence p e n a l t y was 
imposed in an overzea lous d i s r e g a r d of e s t a b l i s h e d law: 
Q [by Mr. Mi l l e r ] Now, i f B r o a d c a s t ' s argument i s 
m e r i t o r i o u s , even though you may cons ide r i t 
wrong, would you s t i l l t h ink a neg l igence p e n a l t y 
would be j u s t i f i e d ? 
A [by Ms. Andersen] Yes, because p e t i t i o n e r should 
have exe rc i s ed care in coming -- because they 
made such a major change in how they accounted 
for the t a x . . . 
Q Suppose they had consu l t ed with you and they j u s t 
came away say ing : "Look, Anna, we d i s a g r e e with 
you." Would you s t i l l have imposed a neg l igence 
pena l ty? 
A Yes. 
Depos i t ion of Anna Andersen a t 35 . 
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CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commission's Decision and brief prompt recall of the 
Danish proverb that "Lawyers and painters can soon change white to 
black."20 This is an easy case. The Tax Commission's Decision 
should be reversed because it holds that Broadcast granted its 
subscribers no "right to possession, operation, or use" of its 
equipment, even though, as both parties to the agreement testified, 
the subscribers possess, operate and use the equipment as granted 
to them by contract. No honest and reasonable definition of the 
"right to possession, operation or use" granted by contract can 
possibly justify the Tax Commission's Decision. This Court should 
not permit the Tax Commission to tax Broadcast by claiming that 
white is really black. 
DATED this / day of January, 1994. 
RANDV M. GRIMSHAW 
MAXWELL A. MILLER 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Broadcast International 
20
 J. Brallier, Lawyers and Other Reptiles 26 (Contemporary Books ed. 
1992) . 
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Attorney General 
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Appendix A 
APPENDIX A 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
1. United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 3 
[ 3. ] To regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes; 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a) (1987) 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the 
amount paid or charged for the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible 
personal property made within the 
state; 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(1) (1987) 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the 
amount paid or charged for the following: 
. . . 
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, or 
consumed in this state. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(8)(a) (1987) 
As used in this chapter: 
. . . 
(8)(a) "Retail sale" means any sale within the 
state of tangible personal property or any other 
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-
103(1), other than resale of such property, item, 
or service by a retailer or wholesaler to a user or 
consumer. 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) (1987) 
As used in this chapter: 
. . . 
(10) "Sale" means any transfer of title, exchange, 
or barter, conditional or otherwise in any manner, 
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of tangible personal property or any other taxable 
item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), for 
a consideration. It includes: 
(a) installment and credit sales; 
(b) any closed transaction constituting a 
sale; 
(c) any sale of electrical energy, gas, 
services, or entertainment taxable under this 
chapter; 
(d) any transaction if the possession of 
property is transferred but the seller retains 
the title as security for the payment of the 
price; and 
(e) any transaction under which right to 
possession, operation, or use of any article 
of tangible personal property is granted under 
a lease or contract and the transfer of 
possession would be taxable if an outright 
sale were made. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(12) (1987) 
(12) "Storage" means any keeping or 
retention of tangible personal property or any 
other taxable item or service under 
Subsection 59-12-103(1), in this state for any 
purpose except sale in the regular course of 
business. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(14)(a) 
(14)(a) "Use" means the exercise of any 
right or power over tangible personal property 
under Subsection 59-12-103(1), incident to the 
ownership or the leasing of that property, 
item, or service. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28) (1987) 
The following sales and uses are exempt from 
the taxes imposed by this chapter: 
2 
(28) property upon which a sales or use tax 
was paid to some other state, or one of its 
subdivisionsf except that the state shall be 
paid any difference between the tax paid and 
the tax imposed by this part and Part 2, and 
no adjustment is allowed if the tax paid was 
greater than the tax imposed by this part and 
Part 2; 
9. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-801 (1987) 
ARTICLE V. ELEMENTS OF SALES AND USE TAX LAWS 
Tax Credit 
1. Each purchaser liable for a use tax on 
tangible personal property shall be entitled 
to full credit for the combined amount or 
amounts of legally imposed sales or use taxes 
paid by him with respect to the same property 
to another state and any subdivision thereof. 
The credit shall be applied first against the 
amount of any use tax due the state, and any 
unused portion of the credit shall then be 
applied against the amount of any use tax due 
a subdivision. Exemption Certificates, 
Vendors May Rely 
2. Whenever a vendor receives and accepts in 
good faith from a purchaser a resale or other 
exemption certificate or other written 
evidence of exemption authorized by the 
appropriate state or subdivision taxing 
authority, the vendor shall be relieved of 
liability for a sales or use tax with respect 
to the transaction. 
10. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(b) (1993) 
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative 
proceedings commenced before the commission, 
the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall: 
(b) grant the commission no deference 
concerning its conclusions of law, 
applying a correction of error standard, 
unless there is an explicit grant of 
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discretion contained in a statute at 
issue before the appellate court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (1987) 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court 
or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
review all final agency action resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1992) 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the 
Court of Appeals any of the matters over which 
the Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction, except: . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992) 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
. . . 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of 
Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
Rule R865-19-23S 
A. Taxpayers selling tangible personal property or 
services to exempt customers are required to keep records 
verifying the nontaxable status of such sales. Records 
shall include: 
1. sales invoices showing the name and identity 
of the customer, and 
2. exemption certificates for exempt sales of 
tangible personal property or services if the 
exemption category is shown on the exemption 
certificate forms or if the sale is to a government 
agency, and the total sale is $100 or less. 
B. The Tax Commission will furnish samples of 
acceptable exemption certificate forms on request. Stock 
quantities are not furnished, but taxpayers may reproduce 
samples as needed in whole or in part. 
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C. Exemption certificates are not required for sales to 
qualified government agencies (federal, state, counties, 
and cities—including schools), but the vendor must keep 
a purchase order or other acceptable evidence of 
exemption, such as a copy of a check or voucher. 
D. If a purchaser is unable to segregate tangible 
personal property or services which he purchases for 
resale from tangible personal property or services which 
he purchases for his own consumption, everything should 
be purchased tax-free. He must then report and pay the 
tax on the cost of goods or services purchased tax-free 
for resale but which are used or consumed. 
E. The burden of proving that a sale is for resale or 
otherwise exempt is upon the person who makes the sale. 
If any agent of the Tax Commission requests the vendor to 
produce a valid exemption certificate or other similar 
acceptable evidence to support the vendor's claim that a 
sale is for resale or otherwise exempt, and the vendor is 
unable to comply, the sale will be considered taxable and 
the tax shall be payable by the vendor. 
Rule 865-19-92S 
A. Definitions: 
1. "Canned computer software" or "prewritten 
computer software" means a program or set of 
programs that can be purchased and used without 
modification and has not been prepared at the 
special request of the purchaser to meet their 
particular needs. 
2. "Custom computer software" means a program or 
set of programs designed and written specifically 
for a particular user. The program must be 
customer ordered and can incorporate preexisting 
routines utilities or similar program components. 
The addition of a customer name or account titles 
or codes will not constitute a customer program. 
3. "Computer-generated output" means the 
microfiche, microfilm, paper, discs, tapes, molds, 
or other tangible personal property generated by a 
computer. 
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4. "License agreement" means the same as a lease 
or rental of computer software. 
B. The sale, rental or lease of canned or prewritten 
computer software constitutes a sale of tangible personal 
property and is subject to the sales or use tax. 
Payments under a license agreement are taxable as a lease 
or rental of the software package. Charges for program 
maintenance, consultation in connection with a sale or 
lease, enhancements, or upgrading of canned or prewritten 
software are taxable. 
C. The sale, rental or lease of custom computer 
software is exempt from the sales or use tax, regardless 
of the form in which the program is transferred. Charges 
for services such as program maintenance, consultation in 
connection with a sale or lease, enhancements, or 
upgrading of custom software are not taxable. 
D. Charges for services to modify or adapt canned 
computer software or prewritten computer software to a 
purchaser's needs or equipment are not taxable if the 
charges are separately stated and identified. 
E. The sale of computer generated output is subject to 
the sales or use tax if the primary object of the sale is 
the output and not the services rendered in producing the 
output. 
F. This rule cites the most common types of 
transactions involving computer software and it should 
not be construed to be inclusive but merely illustrative 
in nature. 
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